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Abstract 
A crucial issue in efficiency-equality evaluations of tax reforms resides in the possibility that the level 
as well as the distribution of welfare may change, where the household-specific measures of welfare 
capture the value of income as well as the value of leisure. A better-designed redistribution and income 
support system may not only foster equality but also improve the configuration of incentives and by 
this route contribute in its turn to efficiency. This paper presents an empirical analysis of the welfare 
effects for married couples of replacing the Italian tax system by three alternative hypothetical 
reforms: a flat tax, a negative income tax, and a work fare scheme. We employ a microeconometric 
model of household labour supply that represents partners’ simultaneous choices, allows for 
constraints in the choice of hours of work, and is sufficiently flexible to capture a large variety of 
supply responses. These features appear to be crucial in the evaluation of reform effects. The results 
suggest that there is scope for improving upon the current system under both the efficiency and the 
equality criterion. The benefits from the reforms, however, come from unexpected directions since the 
largest contribution to the increase in welfare come from poor and middle class households whereas 
rich households appear to be much less responsive to changes in the tax rates. The simulation results 
reveal that a crucial role in shaping the results is played by the relatively higher behavioural 
responsiveness of married women living in low and average income households. 
 
Keywords: Tax reforms, labour supply, welfare gains and losses, efficiency-equality trade-off, social 
welfare 
 
JEL classification: D19, D69, J22 
 1
1. Introduction 
In the last few years a debate has developed in Italy upon reforming the tax-transfer treatment of 
households. Although with some delay, the debate follows closely enough policy discussions that are 
going on in other OECD countries, and moves around two focal issues. The first one concerns the 
possibly large loss in efficiency due to disincentives and distortions on worker behaviour caused by 
progressive taxation. The reform proposals that are mainly motivated by such arguments tend to 
suggest a flatter profile of the marginal tax rates (with the pure “flat tax” as a limit case) together with 
a reduction of the levels of the tax rates. The second issue stems from the widespread observation that 
the current Italian system of transfers and benefits directly or indirectly related to supporting the life 
standard of needy or poor or in any sense disadvantaged households performs rather poorly both in 
terms of cost-effectiveness and fairness.  The reform proposals that are mainly inspired by this concern 
by and large converge in supporting some more or less universal basic transfer, or basic guaranteed 
level of income, or basic endowment.  
 The picture is mirrored into the political platforms of alternative coalitions. Since the 
publication of a “Libro Bianco” on behalf of the Ministry of Finance in 19941, up to the tax reform 
proposals contained in the 2001 election platform, the quest for lower and “flatter” tax rates has been 
supported with more energy by the centre-right coalition (“Casa delle Liberta”), while the concern for 
a more equitable and cost-effective system of income support and redistribution has been more a 
policy focus of the recent centre-left governments2 (“Ulivo”) as well as of the electoral platform of the 
centre-left coalition. It must be recognised however that the two issues are more complementary than 
alternative. For example, a non-technical article by Rizzi and Rossi (1997) proposes an overall reform 
of the tax-transfer system combining a basic universal transfer with a flat tax, very much in line with 
the arguments developed in Atkinson (1995). A similar proposal, under the label of “social dividend”, 
was included in the 2001 electoral platform of the centre-left coalition3.  
Previous exercises applied to Italy have adopted non-behavioural simulations for evaluating reforms 
similar to the ones mentioned above4. When account is not taken of behavioural responses, the 
                                                     
1 Ministero delle Finanze (1994) 
2 See Commissione Onofri (1997) for analyses and proposals elaborated upon these issues during the last centre-left 
government.  
3 Ministero del Tesoro (2000).  
4 Baldini and Bosi (2001) use a static micro-simulation model to evaluate the effects on income distribution and on net tax 
revenue of the two reforms contained in the electoral platforms of the two opposed coalitions, and conclude that they both are 
undesirable. The (almost) flat tax proposal - proposed by the centre-right coalition - would according to the results of Baldini 
and Bosi - entail a major loss in revenue; to keep revenue constant an unbearably high rate would be required. On the other 
hand, the “social dividend + flat rate” reform - proposed by the centre-left coalition - would have positive effects on 
redistribution but again would require an exceedingly high flat rate to keep the revenue constant. Another example of non-
behavioural simulation analysis of this type of reforms is provided by Bourguignon et al. (1997). 
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dimension of the (gross) “cake” is obviously fixed. However, the crucial issue in efficiency-equality 
evaluation resides precisely in the possibility that the dimension (along with the distribution) of the 
cake may change. Less distortionary tax rates may generate a larger amount of resources available for 
redistribution; a better designed redistribution and income support system may not only foster equality 
but also improve the configuration of incentives and by this route contribute in its turn to efficiency. In 
this paper we use a model of household labour supply to evaluate stylised versions of the above reform 
ideas. A behavioural model might reveal the possibility of improving both efficiency and equality. We 
use a pre-estimated household labour supply model, briefly described in Appendix A. 
 The social evaluation methodology we use is a generalisation of King (1983), where 
measures of welfare are derived from equivalent incomes defined in terms of a reference household 
and of the prices (wages) and opportunities that this household faces. The introduction of a reference 
state (household characteristics, market opportunities and prices) is made in order to compare welfare 
across households and opportunity sets5. A recent example of a policy simulation exercise using a 
consistent social evaluation methodology that is close to the one adopted in this paper is provided by 
Fortin et al. (1993). Their study, however, relies on a calibrated (not estimated) and a rather restrictive 
model of household labour supply based on a Stone-Geary utility function that has not been subjected 
to empirical testing. 
 The methodology for welfare evaluation is explained in section 2, whilst the tax reforms in 
question and a brief outline of the 1993 tax regime are described in section 3 and Appendix B. The 
simulation results are also reported in section 3. Section 4 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Behavioural micro-simulation and welfare evaluation  
The simulation tool is a microeconometric model of household labour supply, previously estimated on 
1993 data. Some essential features of the model are synthetically illustrated in Appendix A6. Here we 
recall the general format of the estimation and policy simulation steps. The i-th household (a couple) is 
assumed to choose a “job” j from a choice-set . The choice set specification accounts for quantity 
constraints, limits to the choice of work hours and different opportunities between households and 
genders. Each job alternative contains a wife’s gross wage rate , a husband’s wage rate , 
iΩ
( )iFw j ( )iMw j
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
5 We also checked the sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of the reference state. 
6 A full presentation of the model and more details on data and estimation can be found in Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm 
(1999) and Aaberge, Colombino, Strøm and Wennemo (2000). Some key features are illustrated in Appendix A. The model 
allows for observed as well as unobserved characteristics in preferences and opportunities, for spouses’ simultaneous 
decisions, for non-convex budget sets due to the complexity of the tax system and for quantity constraints on the choice of 
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wife’s hours of work , husband’s hours of work  and other unobserved (by the analysts) 
characteristics. The choice set contains also non-market activities, with and . Let 
be the gross household income associated with job j, where 
represent other (exogenous) income. Net household income under tax-transfer regime k will then be 
, where - a function of gross incomes - 
represents the tax-transfer rule that computes the net tax to be paid under tax-transfer regime k. 
Preferences are represented by the utility function U , where is a 
random variable that represents the joint effects of household’s and job’s characteristics. The i-th 
household then solves the problem 
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The observed 1993 behaviour is assumed to be generated by the solution of the problem above under 
the 1993 tax-transfer regime. The data set used includes 2160 married couples in age 18-54 belonging 
to the 1993 Bank-of-Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW93). On the basis of 
observed behaviour we estimate the utility function and the parameters of the choice sets7. The 
simulation consists in solving  
  
R w h w
= −
h m R
∀
w h w
ε
  h m
∈Ω
  (2.2) 
  
The first constraint is the i-th household's budget constraint. The second one is the constant-tax-
revenue constraint and concerns all households.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
hours of work. Previous structural labour supply models estimated on Italian data include Colombino (1985) and Colombino 
and Del Boca (1990).    
7 The estimates of this specific version of the model are presented in Aaberge, Colombino, Strøm and Wennemo (2000). 
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 Let ( ) ( ), , max ( ), ( ), ( ) , ( )k ki i i i iF iM ijm R U h j h j Y j R jε∈ΩΩ = −  represent the m imum u
level attained by household ndowed with exogenous income im , facing choice set iΩ  and ta
transfer rule k
i
V
 i, e
ax tility 
x-
R . Let us consider now a reference household S that faces choice set , and a SΩ
reference tax-transfer rule SR . We ask what is the exogenous income kiy that would allow the 
re ); km R : ference h
(2.3) 
direct 
and a reference tax-transfer rule 
ousehold in the reference setting to reach utility ( ,i iV Ω i i
  
 ( ) ( ), , , ,k k SV m R V y RΩ = Ω . 
  
Thus, ( ), , ; ,k k k Sy y R m R= Ω Ω can be considered as a generalisation of the concept of in
money-metric utility as defined in Varian (1992) or in King (1983) – where it is called equivalent 
income
i i i S S i
i i i i S
8. The use of a reference choice set SSΩ R  allows 
ompc ns between policy reforms defined by changes in ariso R  and/or Ω . The use of a reference 
household-specific equivalent incomes.  
 Le
household (or reference household characteristics) makes it meaningful to compare and aggregate the 
t us suppose the status quo is some tax-transfer rule 0R . Under this regime, household i 
 
defined by 
attains utility level ( )0, , . The money-metric representation 0y of this utility level is implicitlyi i iV m RΩ i
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d
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The equivalent incomes 1iy  an
0
iy  for household i represent the levels of (exogenous) income that 
ords the reference household S th  same le el of utility under the reference choice set SΩ and the 
reference tax-transfer system S
 
R  as household i attains under tax systems 1R  and 0R  (and choice set 
iΩ ). Thus, the difference between 
1
iy  and 
0
iy  for household i emerges as an appropriate measure of 
                                                     
8 The concept must not be confused with the homonymous one used in the equivalence scales literature. 
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the household-specific welfare effect of changing tax-transfer system from 0R  to 1R . Moreover, sinc
the money values of the household's utilities are define
e 
d in term
ifference between the two equivalent incomes can be inter
(2.6) 
 
l 
es the same net revenue as the actual 1993 rule. 
m 
a rence - the 
mp
ay require the use of a social welfare function. Moreover, social we
quantities for summarising the information content of the distribution of CWGs. In this study we use 
=  (2.7) 
where  is the left inverse of the cumulative distribution functio
transfer rule k and pb(t) is a weight function defined by  
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lete ranking of these distributions 
fixed prices and a fixed choice set, this welfare measure are comparable across households. The 
d preted as a monetary measure of welfare 
change and we will call it Comparable Welfare Gain: 
  
 1 0i i iCWG y y= −  
  
 We use flat tax (FT) as the reference tax system. The reason for this choice is that the 
evaluation of the equivalent income defined by equation (2.3) is computationally much more 
convenient if the reference system is a system where tax rates are not subject to choice. Any 
alternative reference tax system will imply endogenous tax rates. The reference tax-transfer rule wil
be the FT rule (defined above) that generat
 It should be emphasised that due to the random utilities employed here we have to perfor
stochastic simulations in order to generate the distribution of the CWGs. The decile-specific mean 
values of CWG are reported in section 3.  
 As indicated above the CWG-values may depend on the choice of reference household. 
Thus, it is important to examine the sensitivity of the results with regard to the choice of reference 
household. In the simulation exercise that follows, we have alternatively used - 
household (and the corresponding choice set) with the lowest, the median and the highest observed 
income. The results, however, are very similar; therefore, to simplify the exposition, we only report the 
results obtained when using the median income household as reference.  
 Although the distributions of CWG generated by alternative tax reforms provide important 
information for evaluating the welfare effects of tax reforms, a co
m lfare functions serve as primary 
the following family of rank-dependent social welfare functions 
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where b is the inequality aversion parameter9. Note that the inequality aversion decreases when b 
increases. It follows by straightforward calculations that W ,b k kμ≤ ( )= mean of the distribution kF y , 
and that W is equal to μk if and only if Fk is the egalitarian distribution. Thus, W  can be 
interpreted as the equally distributed equivalent level of equivalent income under tax regime k. 
,b k ,b k
 Aaberge (2000) demonstrated that the following family of inequality measures,  
 ,, 1 , 1,2,...
b k
b k
k
W
C b
μ
= − =  (2.9) 
yields a complete characterization of the distribution function Fk provided that the mean is known10. 
Moreover, Aaberge (2000) justified that the use of a few of these inequality measures may give a good 
summarization of inequality in the distribution function. 
 When the tax-benefit rule is changed from 0R to 1R expression (2.9) can be exploited to 
measure the proportionate social gain11 defined by the expression 
  
 
( )
( )
1 ,,1
,0 0 ,
1
1
bb
b
b b
CW
W C
μξ
μ
−
= =
−
1
0
. (2.10) 
Expression (2.10) shows that the effect on social welfare can be decomposed into the product of the 
efficiency effect 1
0
μ
μ
 and the equality effect 
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the ratio between the means of the post- and pre-reform equivalent incomes. Therefore we also have: 
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9 Several other authors have discussed rationales for this approach, see e.g. Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark 
(1981), Yaari (1988), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1992) and Aaberge (2001). 
10  Note that { }
,
, 2
b k
C b ≥  is the “generalised” Gini family introduced by Mehran (1976). It can be easily verified that C2k is 
equal to the Gini coefficient. For unimodal distributions that are not strongly skew to the right or left the Gini coefficient is 
most sensitive to changes that take place in the middle part of the income distribution. As noted by Aaberge (2000) C1k 
exhibits strong downside inequality aversion and is equivalent to a measure of inequality that was introduced by Bonferroni 
(1930). By contrast, C3k exhibits upside inequality aversion and therefore yields a supplement to the information provided by 
the Gini coefficient and the Bonferroni coefficient. 
 
11 The terminology is taken from King (1983). 
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3. Tax reforms 
Since the model we use for the tax simulations is estimated on 1993 data, we take the 1993 tax rule as 
the status quo (R0). It is essentially a system of increasing marginal tax rates, going from 10 per cent 
(up to 7,2 millions of ITL) to 50 per cent (over 300 millions of ITL), which are applied to individual 
total annual income. For more details we refer to the Appendix B. Since 1993 the number of brackets 
has been reduced, but the essential characteristics of the system are still the same12. 
 The hypothetical reforms are stylised representations of ideas that – as mentioned in section 
1 – are a matter of debate and proposal in Italy as well as in other OECD countries, with differing 
focus on different aspects of the tax regime. On the one hand there is a quest for a flatter profile of the 
marginal tax rates in order to reduce disincentives and enhance efficiency13. On the other hand, and 
specifically in Italy, it is recognised that the system of basic income support provides transfers that are 
not cost-effective and do not respond to any explicit design of social or family policy, and that 
therefore the system needs to be rationalised on a more transparent and universalistic basis. Under 
different labels, the ideas belonging to this second strand, converge on proposing some type of basic 
income scheme, either in the form of a universal transfer or in the form of transfer that compensate 
incomes up to a basic level. The quests for more efficiency via a flatter tax profile and for more, or not 
less, equality via a more cost-effective system of income support are far from being mutually 
exclusive. In fact many proposals (e.g. Atkinson, 1995 and, for Italy Rizzi and Rossi, 1997, and more 
recently Ministero del Tesoro, 2000) match a flat tax with a basic income scheme. In what follows, we 
evaluate three different systems that in one way or another can satisfy these criteria. The first is a 
proportional or flat tax (FT). If Y represents total gross income, the tax FTR  to be paid by the 
household is  
  
  (3.1) YtR FT
FT
=
  
where  is a constant marginal tax rate. Besides incorporating the idea of minimising distortions, it 
is also a benchmark system, useful for comparison. As mentioned above it will also be used as the 
reference tax rule since it is computationally convenient to do so.   
FTt
                                                     
12 In the text and in the tables, the figures are in 000's of Italian Lire. In order to translate into EURO, the figures should be 
divided by 1.93627. 
13 Another motivation for less progressive tax rates is to reduce the incentives to evasion and elusion. 
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 The second reform is a simple negative income tax (NIT), where a flat tax is complemented 
with a transfer (a negative tax) that guarantees households’ income up to a basic level G14: 
  
  (3.2) ( )
NIT
NIT
Y G if Y G
R
t Y G if Y G
− ≤
= 
− ≥
  
  Last, we consider the so-called WorkFare (WF) system, which essentially is a modification 
of NIT where the transfer is received only if the household works a minimum required amount of 
hours15, 
  
 
( )
min
min
0
WF
WF
if Y G and H H
R Y G if Y G and H H
t Y G if Y G
 ≤ <
= − ≤ >
− ≥
 (3.3) 
  
where tWF is a constant marginal tax rate, H represent the total hours worked by the wife and the 
husband and Hmin is a minimum required number of hours worked (set equal to 1000 in the 
simulation). Although similar to the NIT, the WF system is interesting to analyse, both because it may 
have better chances to receive political support and because of the theoretical argument according to 
which under certain conditions it can be proved to be Pareto-superior to NIT16.    
 Note that NIT and FT RR , WFR  are functions of the wife and husband's earnings and the other 
income of the couple. NIT and WF are interpreted as reforms that try to compound the criterion of 
lessening distortions from high marginal tax rates and the criterion of redesigning the basic income 
support system in a more effective way. Since the actual basic income support policies are thought to 
be rather wasteful and occasionally even inequitable, there might be scope for reforms that are able to 
increase both efficiency and equality.  
                                                     
14 In this exercise we limit ourselves to the NIT and do not consider the possibly less realistic basic income in the form of a 
universal unconditional transfer. The idea of a minimum guaranteed income or alternatively of a universal basic income or 
wealth transfer, has a long tradition in economics and political philosophy and can be traced back to Tom Paine, Charles 
Fourier and John Stuart Mill amongst others. More recently, it motivated proposals from scholars with radically different 
ideology, from Friedman (1964) to Van Parijs (1995), passing through Tobin (1966), Meade (1978) and Atkinson (1995) to 
cite a few. A recent articulated proposal  for a universal transfer in the form of an initial endowment is put forward by 
Ackerman and Alstott (1999). Targetti Lenti (2000) provides a survey with focus on the Italian case. 
15 In the simulation exercise we put Hmin = 1000 (cumulatively for the two partners). Alternatively - and more generally - one 
might think of making the transfer conditional on some other decision made by the household, such as taking part in a 
training program.   
16 See Fortin et al. (1993). 
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 For each of the reforms illustrated above, the simulation consists in solving problem (2.2). 
For each reform there is a marginal tax rate that must be endogenously determined by the simulation as 
the one generating the same total tax revenue as of 1993, given the other parameters of the tax-transfer 
rules17. The constant-revenue marginal tax rates turn out to be 0.184 (FT), 0.284 (NIT) and 0.273 
(WF). The average net tax rate (i.e. the ratio of total net tax revenue to total gross income) is 0.20 
under 1993 regime and goes down to 0.184 (FT), 0.198 (NIT) and 0.195 (WF). Since net tax revenue 
is kept constant, the result of a lower average tax rate reveals that all the reforms induce behavioural 
changes that generate a larger total gross income18. 
 As a way of summarising the basic behavioural features implied by the model, before 
entering the illustration of reforms simulation, in Table 1 we show the labour supply elasticity with 
respect to wage, broken down by gender and household income. They are obtained by increasing gross 
wages by 1%, computing the new labour supply choices individual by individual and then averaging 
across the sample. We observe a very clear-cut difference of responsiveness between wife and husband 
and a marked inverse dependence of elasticity on household income19. This pattern of elasticities 
suggests that women living in low or average income households play a crucial role in determining 
reform effects, provided the reform implies significant changes in incentives for them. Table 1 also 
reveals that cross-elasticities – again mostly for women in low and average income brackets – are far 
from irrelevant, thus giving support to the choice of modelling the joint decisions by household 
members. Below we suggest that they significantly contribute in explaining some apparently 
counterintuitive results. 
 Tables 2-5 illustrate the simulation results under various perspectives. Table 2 shows the 
simulated effects of the alternative tax rules upon labour supply, gross income and disposable income. 
All the reforms lead to an increase of average household gross and net income. As expected the FT 
scheme creates less distortion on labour supply than the NIT and WF schemes. However, compared to 
observed labour supply under the 1993 tax rules female labour supply has a small reduction as a 
consequence of NIT, a small increase as a consequence of WF, and a slightly larger increase as a 
consequence of FT. However, whatever the reform, labour supply among females in the first two 
poorest deciles always increases. In other words, no significant disincentives to participation or any 
                                                     
17 For FT, the marginal tax rate is of course constant for any level of income. For NIT and WF is the (constant) marginal tax 
rate applied to incomes above the guaranteed level G.  
18 This effect can be due to more participants, and/or more hours worked among participants, and/or a more productive pool 
of participants (i.e. a favourable selection effect).  
19 It is worthwhile noting that the functional form adopted for representing household utility (see Appendix A) does not 
imply a priori any particular relationship between supply elasticity and household income or individual wage.   
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“poverty trap” effects emerge in the lowest two deciles20. Among the possible explanation of this 
apparently counterintuitive result, we stress two. First, the pattern of cross-elasticities reported in 
Table 1 shows that the cross elasticity of labour supply for the wives in the two poorest deciles (with 
respect to the husband’s wage) is positive (0.82 per cent). Also, for a majority of men, the marginal 
wage rate increases as a consequence of any of the reforms, particularly on full-time jobs. Given the 
positive cross-elasticity, this leads to an increase in the wife’s labour supply. Second, there is a 
possible effect of the interactions of the reforms with the quantity constraints on the hours choice. As 
explained in Appendix A, the model accounts for the fact that not every type of job is equally available 
to every individual. If, for example, part-time jobs are hard to find, at least for some women, the 
relevant comparison is the one between non-participation and full-time jobs. In a sense, the average net 
wage rate becomes more relevant than the marginal net wage. Thus, it may well be the case that a 
reform implies a higher (compared to the 1993 system) net income on a full-time job. This effect will 
encourage participation even if the entrance marginal tax rate is higher (FT) or if unearned income 
increases (NIT and WF). Note that a traditional model, where different job type availability is not 
taken into account, could not have captured such an effect. Overall, it is worthwhile noting that the 
specific features of the microeconometric model employed – partners’ simultaneous choices, 
constraints in the choice of hours and ability to capture a large variety of supply responses – turn out to 
be crucial in explaining the simulation results.  
In Table 3 we present the mean value CWGs of the three reforms outlined above, 
disaggregated by 1993 household welfare decile and by “winners” and “losers”. For each reform, three 
simulation exercises have been performed, using three different reference households. However, since 
the results are similar, for simplicity of exposition we only report the results obtained with the median 
income household as reference21. All the reforms are more efficient than the 1993 rule, since for each 
reform the overall average CWG is positive. Also the overall proportion of winners is always positive. 
However, the distributional effects are very different. It seems clear that FT is disequalising, since the 
average CWG is negative for the worst-off fraction of the sample. Also, there is a majority of losers in 
the worst-off deciles. On the other hand the results of Table 3 suggest that NIT and WF might be 
equalising, since the only decile to loose is the best-off one. Note that the identification of the 
                                                     
20 One would expect a disincentive to participation from FT - since it increases the entrance marginal tax rate) - , and a 
poverty trap effect (on top of a disincentive to participation) from NIT (if not from WF) - since it guarantees an income G 
even to non-participants and applies a 100 per cent tax rate up to the point when labour income reaches G. As explained in 
the main text, however, these arguments might cease to be valid once it is recognised that not every type of job – and in 
particular not every hours value – is equally available.   
21 The results obtained with the three different reference households are reported in a working paper by Aaberge, Colombino 
and  Strøm (2001) that can be downloaded from CHILD web page (www.child-centre.it).  
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proportions of winners and losers solely requires ordinal utility information. Thus, the estimates of the 
proportions of winners and losers are independent of the choice of reference state. 
 
Table 1 Labour supply elasticity for married females and married males by deciles of household 
disposable income 
 Female elasticity Male elasticitiy  
Type of elasticity  Own wage 
elasticities 
Cross 
elasticities 
Own wage
elasticities 
Cross 
elasticities 
1 2.40   0.26   0.04 -0.02 
2 1.35 -0.19   0.05 -0.02 
3-8 0.54 -0.18   0.01 -0.01 
9 0.16 -0.16   0.02 -0.01 
 
Elasticity of the 
probability of 
participation 
10 0.10 -0.15   0.02   0.00 
1 1.60   0.55   0.28   0.08 
2 0.83   005   0.12   0.02 
3-8 0.18 -0.06   0.08 -0.02 
9 0.04 -0.04   0.06 -0.02 
Elasticity of the 
conditional 
expectation of 
total supply of 
hours 10 0.04 -0.02   0.04 -0.02 
1 4.44   0.82   0.32   0.06 
2 2.31 -0.15   0.17   0.00 
3-8 0.73 -0.24   0.10 -0.04 
9 0.20 -0.20   0.08 -0.03 
Elasticity of the 
unconditional 
expectation of 
total supply of 
hours 10 0.13 -0.17   0.06 -0.02 
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 Table 2. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income and taxes 
for married couples under alternative tax regimes by deciles of disposable household 
income under 1993-taxes 
    Annual hours of work Households, 1000 ITL 1993 
 
Tax 
regime 
 
 
Decile 
Participation 
rates, 
per cent 
Given 
participation 
In the total 
population 
Gross 
income 
Taxes Dis-
posable 
income 
  M F M F M F    
 
 
1993- 
tax rules 
1 
2 
3-8 
9 
10 
95.6
97.5
98.9
99.3
99.4 
14.1 
19.9 
43.8 
65.5 
74.4 
1571
1832
1991
2117
2237 
1030
1209
1546
1731
1828 
1501
1787
1970
2103
2225 
 145
 241
 677
1133
1361 
 15221 
 24372 
 48187 
 85135 
128396 
  525 
 2109 
 8960 
19983 
34365 
14695 
22263 
39227 
65152 
94032 
 All 98.5 43.7 1972 1590 1943  694  54225 11074 43150 
 
 
FT 
1 
2 
3-8 
9 
10 
95.4
97.8
99.0
99.4
99.5 
19.6 
24.4 
44.7 
64.5 
73.2 
1706
1924
2048
2162
2267 
1264
1397
1585
1741
1834 
1627
1882
2027
2150
2257 
 247
 342
 709
1124
1344 
 22933 
 31761 
 54142 
 89459 
132888 
 4219 
 5845 
 9961 
16460 
24452 
 18714 
 25917 
 44181 
 72999 
108435 
 All 98.6 45.0 2036 1623 2008  731  60189 11074  49115 
 
 
NIT 
1 
2 
3-8 
9 
10 
95.28 
97.13 
98.63 
99.21 
99.49 
14.44 
19.91 
41.42 
63.29 
72.59 
1551
1820
1996
2138
2252 
1056
1240
1540
1733
1832 
1478
1768
1969
2121
2241 
 152
 247
 638
1097
1331 
 16404 
 26199 
 49801 
 86985 
130581 
-1952 
 2537 
 9538 
20218 
32714 
18356 
23662 
40263 
66767 
97867 
 All 98.29 41.87 1976 1589 1942  665  55897 11074 44823 
 
 
WF 
1 
2 
3-8 
9 
10 
95.32 
97.45 
98.82 
99.31 
99.49 
15.19 
20.28 
42.20 
63.56 
72.96 
1621
1866
2018
2145
2256 
1117
1285
1548
1738
1833 
1545
1818
1994
2130
2244 
 170
 260
 653
1105
1338 
 17655 
 27280 
 50669 
 87455 
131013 
  -247 
 2956 
 9487 
19569 
31538 
17902 
24324 
41182 
67885 
99476 
 All 98.45 42.52 2001 1597 1970  679  56742 11074 45668 
Note to Table 2. The results for WF are new, while the results for 1993, FT and NIT are taken from 
Aaberge et al. (2000). 
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 Table 3. The distribution of CWG by losers and winners, and by deciles of household equivalent 
income1) under 1993-taxes when the 1993 tax regime is replaced by various alternative 
tax regimes 
 
Average CWG 
in 1000 ITL 
Tax-
transfer 
rule 
Deciles Winners 
Per cent of 
the total 
population 
All 
couples
Losers Winners 
1 41.5 -122 -5228  7051 
2 43.5 457 -5641  8310 
3-8 52.0 2848 -6029 11058 
9 60.1 6307 -6607 14926 
10 60.9 7325 -8299 17460 
 
FT 
All 51.8 3105 -6121 11703 
1 65.3 3039 -2620  6082 
2 59.2 2208 -2762  5634 
3-8 54.6 1736 -3998  6526 
9 51.4 1573 -5595  8408 
10 46.1 -808 -9719  9726 
 
 
NIT 
All 55.0 1643 -4640  6821 
1 64,8 2750 -2656 5732 
2 59,3 2165 -2773 5540 
3-8 55,4 1835 -3958 6531 
9 52,6 1793 -5551 8459 
10 47,6 -478 -9668 9776 
 
 
WF 
All 55,6 1724 -4594 6790 
1) Equivalent income and CWG are defined using the median income household as reference  
 In Tables 4 and 5 we extend the analysis to the social welfare effect and its components. We 
use  defined by ,b kW (2.7) and (2.8) for  The corresponding measures of social 
welfare have been calculated for both the pre- and post-reform distributions of equivalent income. The 
values of proportionate social gain 
1,2, 3 and b= ∞
bξ defined by (2.10) are given in Table 4. All the reforms produce a 
positive social gain for any value of the inequality aversion parameter b. As we have noted above, ξ
∞
 
ignores distributional effects and solely captures the efficiency gains of the reform. In other words, the 
last column of Table 4 contains the ratio between the average equivalent income under a certain reform 
and the average equivalent income under the 1993 rule. Thus, if we only care about efficiency we look 
at the last column and read that social gain is 2.1% under FT, 0.8% under NIT and 1.1% under WF. If 
we also care about the distribution of equivalent income, and we adopt – say – a Gini welfare function 
(i.e. we use (2.7) with b = 2), then the social gain is 0.9% under FT, 1.5% under NIT and 1.6% under 
WF. As we can see from (2.10) or (2.11), the proportionate social gain of Table 4 can be factored into 
the efficiency effect (i.e. ξ
∞
) and the equality effect (i.e. ( ) ( ),1 ,01 1bC C− − b ). Table 5 reports the 
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equality effects. The reforms are equalising (disequalising) if the entries are greater (lower) than 1. For 
example,  equality is increased by 0.7% under the NIT reform when we employ the Gini welfare 
function (i.e. b=2).     
 
Table 4. Proportionate social gain under the tax-transfer reforms  
 
bξ   
Tax-transfer rule b = 1 b = 2 b = 3 b =  
FT 1.002 1.009 1.012 1.021 
NIT 1.020 1.015 1.013 1.008 
WF 1.019 1.016 1.015 1.011 
 
 
 
Table 5. Equality effects of the tax-transfer reforms 
 
( )
( )
,1
,0
1
1
b
b
C
C
−
−
 
 
Tax-transfer rule 
b = 1 b = 2 b = 3 
FT 0.981 0.988 0.991 
NIT 1.012 1.007 1.005 
WF 1.008 1.005 1.004 
  
 
Table 4 and Table 5 together reveal that all the reforms attain a positive social gain but through a 
different route. Namely, FT is efficient but disequalising; the social gain is positive since the 
efficiency effect more than compensates the disequalising effect, even when social welfare function 
(the Bonferroni welfare function, b = 1) exhibits rather strong inequality aversion. On the other hand, 
NIT and WF are both efficient and equalising with respect to the 1993 rule. It appears therefore that it 
is possible to overcome the trade-off between efficiency and equality. NIT and WF just provide two 
 15
examples. It is worthwhile noting however that the benefits from the reforms seem to come from an 
unexpected direction. Most advocates of lower marginal tax rates for higher incomes (as it is true of all 
the three reforms we have simulated) tend to think that the rich are more responsive than the poor. 
According to this view, thanks to better incentives, the rich would increase labour supply and take up 
more productive opportunities, and by this way they would contribute to a bigger cake. Looking into 
the details of our simulation, however, we discover that what happens is quite the opposite. Table 2 
reveals that the largest response to the reforms in terms of hours comes from households belonging to 
low and average income deciles. This is also consistent with the pattern of supply elasticities presented 
in Table 1.  The reforms we have simulated indeed exploit already some of the implications of this 
pattern of behavioural responses, by lowering marginal taxes also for some fraction of the average 
income population. For example, an individual income of 30,000,000 ITL (somewhat above the 
average individual income in 1993) would face – according to 1993 tax rule – a marginal tax rate equal 
to 34%. For the same income, the marginal tax rates under the reforms would be lower (FT: 18.4%; 
NIT: 28.4%; WF: 27.3%). Moreover, under NIT and WF rules, the reformed marginal tax rates - 
although rather low in absolute terms - are high enough to finance a guaranteed income such that both 
rules turn out to be also equalising (besides being more efficient with respect to the 1993 regime). 
However, for the very high incomes - say those facing a 51% marginal tax rate - the gain is obviously 
much higher, although their supply elasticity is close to zero. NIT or WF might probably be improved 
upon for example by using a two-rate tax instead of the flat rate, with the lower rate imposed on low 
and average incomes. Interestingly enough, a tax-transfer rule of this sort appears to enlarge the scope 
for an improvement of both efficiency and equality, since then lower tax rates would fall upon the 
individuals who are both more elastic and poorer22.   
                                                     
22 Note that the argument is at odds with a widespread opinion, according to which efficiency should be pursued by cutting 
taxes on the highest incomes. See Røed and Strøm (2001) and Fitoussi (2000) for - respectively - a recent provocative survey 
and an informed opinion that also oppose the conventional wisdom. We are using here an argument inspired by the Ramsey – 
inverse elasticity – rule, according to which less elastic behaviours should be taxed more in order to collect a given amount. 
Of course the argument cannot be used literally in this context since the criterion that differentiates elasticities (i.e. household 
income) depends also on the elasticities themselves. Computations by Saez (2001) seem to give support to the above 
conjecture. However Saez uses a calibrated model based on a rather specification. A rigorous analysis fully exploiting the 
complexity of our empirical model would require locating the social welfare maximising tax rule over a general family of tax 
rules. This is however computationally very cumbersome, unless the rule can be defined by two or three parameters as in the 
exercises illustrate in this paper. We are currently working on extending the simulation procedure to more general families of 
tax rules.   
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 4. Conclusion 
Using a flexible microeconometric model of household labour supply, we have simulated behavioural 
responses and welfare gains and losses for married couples resulting from replacing the Italian tax 
system as of 1993 by three alternative tax- transfer regimes: a flat tax, a negative income tax and a 
work-fare system. The specific features of the microeconometric model employed – partners’ 
simultaneous choices, constraints in the choice of hours and ability to capture a large variety of supply 
responses – appear to be very important in explaining the simulation results.  
For the purpose of social welfare evaluation, we draw on King (1983) by deriving welfare change 
measures from equivalent incomes (or indirect money metric utilities) defined in terms of a reference 
household and of the prices that this household faces. Using a social welfare criterion, the striking 
result emerges that all of the reforms are efficient, and that while FT is disequalising, NIT and WF are 
also equalising. The results are robust with respect to the choice of the reference household in 
computing welfare effects. Therefore the analysis suggests that there is indeed scope for designing a 
system that is superior to the current one according to both efficiency and equality. However, the 
benefits produced by the reforms seem to come from a direction that is very different from the 
expectations of most advocates of the reforms themselves. Namely, all the reforms entail a significant 
increase of household gross income, but large part of the labour supply contribution comes from lower 
and average income households. Rich households change their choices very little and essentially 
receive a rent in the form of lower taxes. At the root of these results there is a marked inverse 
dependence of labour supply wage elasticities on household income. NIT or WF might be probably 
improved upon moving along unconventional directions, such as lowering taxes and flattening 
marginal rates not so much for the rich but rather for the low and average income households. 
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Appendix A 
The microeconometric model 
 
The model is fully described in Aaberge, Colombino, Strøm and Wennemo (2000). A more technical 
presentation, with some differences in the empirical specification, is provided by Aaberge, Colombino 
and Strøm (1999). Here we give a concise sketch, using the terminology introduced in section 2.  
The choice set  for household i contains a certain number (unknown to us) of “household 
opportunities”, each of them described by a couple of work hours (
iΩ
,F Mh h ), a couple of gross wage 
rates ( ,F Mw w
( ,i F
) and by other unobserved characteristics (see over). The subscripts F and M refer to the 
wife (Female) and to the husband (Male). The choice set is modelled through the definition of the 
p.d.f. ,M , )F Mp h h w w , which can be interpreted as the relative frequency (in the choice set) of an 
opportunities requiring  ( ,F Mh h ) hours, paying wage rates ( ,F Mw w ). The choice set includes both 
market opportunities (jobs) and non-market opportunities (which have all zero hours and zero wage, 
but typically differ as to other unobserved characteristics). More precisely: 
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  for > 0 and  >0
( ) ( )(1 )  for = 0 and  >0
( , , , , )
( ) ( ) (1 ) for > 0 and  = 0
(1 )(1 ) for =
h h w w
iF F iM M iF F iM M iF iM F M
h w
iM M iM M iF iM F M
i F M F M i h w
iF F iF F iF iM F M
iF iM F
g h g h g w g w g g h h
g h g w g g h h
f h h w w
g h g w g g h h
g g h
e
-
=
-
- -  0 and  = 0Mh
ìïïïïïïíïïïïïïî
 (A.1) 
where 
( )hij jg h = conditional p.d.f. of opportunities requiring jh hours for gender j, given jh > 0; it is specified 
as uniform with a peak corresponding to full-time;  
( )wij jg w = conditional p.d.f. of opportunities paying wage jw  for gender j, given jh > 0; it is specified 
as log-normal, with the mean depending on Education, Age and Regional dummies;  
0
ijg  = probability of opportunities with jh > 0 for gender j; it is specified as logistic with location 
parameter depending on regional dummies and on local gender-specific unemployment rates. 
For more details on the empirical specification of the opportunity p.d.f.s we refer again to Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strøm (1999) and Aaberge, Colombino, Strøm and Wennemo (2000). 
The utility level attained by household i when choosing a given opportunity depends however not only 
on the observed characteristics of the opportunity (hours and wages) and of the household, but also on 
unobserved characteristics. We assume that utility can be factorised as  
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( , , , ) ( , , )i i iF iM i i iF iM iU C h h C h hε ε= Ψ + , where ε  is a random variable acco nting for the joint effect o
household’s and opportunity’s unobserved characteristics. We assume t
u f 
he s are independent draws  ε
{ }{ }exp exp E− − . Eε ≤ ) = from a standard Type I extreme value distribution, i.e. Prob(
For the s stematic utility a Box-Cox funcy tional form is chosen: 
      
( ) [ ] 1 4
8
2
2 3 5 6 7
1 4
2
9 10 11 12 13
8
1 1, , ln (ln )
1ln (ln ) 6 6
a
M
i F M M M
a
F
F F
C LC h h a N a a A a A
a
La a A a A a CU a CO
a
α
α
α
  
− −Ψ = + ⋅ + + + ⋅    
 
− + + + + + ⋅    
  
  (A.2) 
 age of 
e 
 
where C  is annual household net (disposable) income, N is the size of the household, Aj is the
gender j, CU6 and CO6 are the number of children below and above 6 years old and Lj is th
proportion of leisure for gender j, defined as 1
8760j
L = − ( jh  is annual hours of work). 
The functional form chosen for representing utility is flexible in the sense that it permits many 
different shapes of labour supply curves and does not impose a priori any specific dependence of 
supply from income or wage. Of course one could assure even more flexibility by - for example - 
introducing interaction terms or by using polynomial approximations. Flexibility, however, has to be 
balanced against other relevant criteria. We favoured a functional form that – although flexibl
permits a direct economic interpretation of the parameters. There is also a more fundamental 
motivation for relying on such a form, which is rooted in psychophysical measurement theory. 
Dagsvik and Strøm (2003) and Dagsvik, Strøm and Jia (2003) prove that a form such as (A.2) is 
implied by certain invariance assum
jh
e – still 
ptions on preferences. A related, although not equivalent, result 
ssumptions above, i choosing an opportunity 
ontaining
was also proved by Luce (1959).  
Given the a  the probability of observing household 
 , ,  and F M F Mh h w wc turns out to be
23: 
 
                                                     
23 For the derivation of the choice density see Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999). The choice densities are similar to 
those produced by the continuous multinomial logit of Ben-Akiva and Watanatada (1981).  The basic versions of the models 
devoloped for example by vanSoest (1995) and Duncan and McRae (1999) can be interpreted as special cases of (A.2) where 
the p.d.f.s pi are set equal to a constant. 
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{ }
{ }
exp ( , , ) ( , , , )
( , , , )
exp ( , , ) ( , , , )
i i F M i F M F M
i Fh hM F M
i i F M i F M F M F M F M
C h h p h h w w
w w
Z y y p y y x x dy dy dx dx
ϕ Ψ=
Ψ        (A.3) 
 
)
with 
( , ,i iF iF iM iM i iF iF iM iM iC w h w h m R w h w h= + + −  m
and 
( , , )i F F M M i F F M MZ x y x y m R x y x y m= + + −  
where R ( ) is the tax paid. The choice probabilities can then be used to jointly estimate the parameters 
of the utility function and of the opportunity density functions by Maximum Likelihood. The 
are reported in Aaberge, Colombino, Strøm and s v
estimates 
 Wennemo (2000). The model perform ery well in 
terms of fit to worked hours and income distribution, which suggest that the specification of the utility 
function and of the opportunity density function are sufficiently flexible to capture the large 
behavioural variability present in the sample.    
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 Appendix B 
The Italian tax system as of 1993 
Here we summarize the main features of the personal income tax system in 1993. The essential 
characteristics of the systems remain unchanged in the following years, although there is a movement 
towards reducing the number of marginal tax rates, introducing a slightly less progressive profile, and 
increasing the amount of the family benefits. 
The unit of taxation is the individual. To the individual total taxable income, the following marginal 
tax rates are applied:  
Income (1000 LIT) Marginal tax rate (per cent) 
Up to 7,200 10 
7,200 - 14,400 22 
14,400 – 30,000 27 
30,000 – 60,000 34 
60,000 – 150,000 41 
150,000 – 300,000 46 
Over 300,000 51 
 
In our sample (Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth, 1993) the average household 
gross income and the average taxes paid in our sample are respectively 54,525,000 ITL and 
11,074,000 ITL. Some expenditures (such as medical or insurance) can be deducted from income 
before applying taxes. Child allowances (83,100 ITL for each child) and dependent spouse allowances 
(719,300 ITL) – up to the amount of the gross tax – can be subtracted from the tax. Allowances are 
also granted to wage workers (690,600 ITL for everyone plus 215,800 ITL if the gross income is 
below 13,200,000 ITL). For example, one implication of the tax allowances is that for tax payer with 
dependent spouse the marginal tax rate attached to the first bracket is zero. Conditional on the number 
of household members, on household total income, and on being a wage worker, the head of the 
household receives family benefits. These transfers are comparatively rather low, besides being 
conditional on occupational status. For example, a household with 1 child would receive 720,000 ITL 
if total household gross income is below 17,306,000 ITL, 240,000 ITL if income is above 17,306,000 
and below 21,632,000, nothing if income is above 21,632,000. The transfers have been increased since 
1993b even in real terms but they remain low in comparison to other European countries.  
 22
References 
 
Aaberge, R. (2000): Characterizations of Lorenz Curves and Income Distributions, Social Choice and 
Welfare 17, 639-653. 
 
Aaberge, R. (2001): Axiomatic Characterization of the Gini Coefficient and Lorenz Curve Orderings, 
Journal of Economic Theory , 101, 115-132. 
 
Aaberge, R., J.K. Dagsvik and S. Strøm (1995): Labor Supply Responses and Welfare Effects of Tax 
Reforms, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(4), 635-659. 
 
Aaberge R., U. Colombino, S. Strøm and T. Wennemo (2000): Joint labour supply of married couples: 
efficiency and distribution effects of tax and labour market reforms, in: Mitton L., Sutherland H. and 
M. Weeks (Eds.) Micro-simulation Modelling for Policy Analysis: Challenges and Innovations, 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Aaberge, R., U. Colombino and S. Strøm (1999): Labor Supply in Italy: An Empirical Analysis of 
Joint Household Decisions, with Taxes and Quantity Constraints, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 
14, 403-422.  
 
Aaberge, R., U. Colombino and S. Strøm (2001): Do More Equal Slices Shrink the Cake?, CHILD 
Working Paper 19/2001 (www.child-centre.it). 
 
Ackerman, B. and A. Alstott (1999): The Stakeholder Society, Yale University Press. 
 
Atkinson, A.B. (1995): Public Economics in Action. The Basic Income Flat Tax Proposal, Clarendon 
Press. 
 
Baldini, and Bosi (2001): An Evaluation of Tax Reforms With Focus on Children Welfare, Working 
Paper CHILD n. 3/2001, http://www.de.unito.it/CHILD/index.html. 
 
Ben-Akiva, M. and Watanatada, T. (1981): “Application of a Continuous Spacial Choice Logit 
Model”, in Manski, C. F. and McFadden D. (eds.) Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with 
Econometric Applications, MIT Press, 1981. 
 23
 Ben Porath, E. and I. Gilboa (1994): Linear Measures, the Gini Index, and the Income-Equality Trade-
off, Journal of Economic Theory 64, 443-467. 
 
Bonferroni, C. (1930): Elementi di Statistica Generale, Seeber, Firenze. 
 
Bouguignon F., O’Donoghue C., Sastre-Descals J., Spadareo A. and F. Utili (1997): “Eur3: a 
Prototype European Tax-Benefit Model”, DAE Working Paper # MU9703, Microsimulation Unit, 
Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge. 
 
Colombino U. (1985): “A Model of Married Women Labour Supply with Systematic and Random 
Disequilibrium Components”, Ricerche Economiche, 39, 2, 165-179. 
 
Colombino, U. and D. Del Boca (1990): “The Effect of Taxes on Labor Supply in Italy”, The Journal 
of Human Resources, 25, 390-414.  
 
Commissione di Indagine sulla Poverta’ (1985): La poverta’ in Italia, Presidenza del Consiglio dei 
Ministri, Roma. 
 
Commissione per l'analisi delle compatibilita' macroeconomiche della spesa sociale (Commissione 
Onofri) (1997): Rapporto Finale, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Roma. 
 
Dagsvik J. K. and S. Strøm (2003): “Analysing Labor Supply Behavior with Latent Job Opportunity 
Sets and Institutional Choice Constraints”, Discussion Paper No. 344, Statistics Norway, Research 
Department. 
 
Dagsvik J. K., S. Strøm and Z. Jia (2003): “A Stochastic Model for the Utility of Income”, Working 
Paper CHILD n. 10/2003, http://www.de.unito.it/CHILD/index.html. 
 
Donaldson, D. and J.A. Weymark (1980): A single Parameter Generalization of the Gini Indices of 
Inequality, Journal of Economic Theory 22, 67-86. 
 
Donaldson, D. and J.A. Weymark (1983): Ethically Flexible Indices for Income Distributions in the 
Continuum, Journal of Economic Theory 29, 353-358. 
 24
 Duncan A. and J. McRae (1999): Household Labour Supply, Childcare Costs and in-Work Benefits: 
modelling the impact of the Working Families Tax Credit in the UK, paper presented to the 
Econometric Society European Meetings, Santiago de Compostela, September 1999 
 
Friedman, M. (1964): The case for negative income tax: a view from the right, in Bunzel, J. (ed.) 
Issues of American Public Policy, Prentice-Hall. 
 
Fitoussi, J. P. (2000): La corsa dell'Europa alle riduzioni fiscali, La Repubblica, 11August 2000. 
 
Fortin, B., Truchon, M. and L. Beauséjour (1993): ”On Reforming the Welfare System. Workfare 
meets the Negative Income Tax”, Journal of Public Economics, 31, 119-151. 
 
King, M. (1983): “Welfare Analysis of Tax Reforms Using Household Data”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 21, 183-214. 
 
Luce, R. D. (1959): “On the Possible Psychological Laws”, Psychological Review, 66, 81-95. 
 
Meade, J. (1978): The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, IFS-Allen and Unwin. 
 
Mehran, F. (1976): Linear Measures of inequality, Econometrica 44, 805-809. 
 
Ministero delle Finanze (1994): La Riforma Fiscale, Supplemet to Il Sole-24 Ore, 19 December 1994. 
 
Ministero del Tesoro (2000): Il dividendo sociale, un'imposta negativa per rinnovare il welfare e 
sostenere i redditi delle famiglie, Comunicato Stampa 15.12.00, http://www.tesoro.it. 
 
Myles D. G. (1997): Public Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Rizzi D. (1996) TBM: un modello statico di microsimulazione, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, 
Universita’ CaFoscari, Venezia. 
 
Rizzi D. and N. Rossi (1997): Minimo vitale e imposta sul reddito proporzionale, in da Empoli and G. 
Muraro (Eds.) Verso Un Nuovo Stato Sociale, Milano, Franco Angeli. 
 25
 26
 
Røed, K. and S. Strøm (2001): Progressive Taxes and the Labor Market - Is the Trade-Off between 
Equality and Efficiency Inevitable?, Journal of Economic Surveys 16, 77-100.  
 
Saez, E. (2001): Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates, Review of Economic Studies, 
68, 205-229. 
 
Targetti Lenti, R. (2000): Reddito di cittadinanza e minimo vitale, Rivista di Scienza delle Finanze e 
Diritto Finanziario 59,  
 
Tobin, J. (1966): The Case for an Income Guarantee, The Public Interest 4, 31-41. 
 
Van Parijs, P. (1995): Real Freedom for All, Oxford University Press. 
 
van Soest, A. (1995): Structural Models of Family Labor Supply: A Discrete Choice Approach, 
Journal of Human Resources  1 , 63-88. 
 
Varian, H. (1992): Microeconomic Analysis, Norton & Company. 
 
Weymark, J. (1981): Generalized Gini Inequality Indices, Mathematical Social Sciences 1, 409-430. 
 
Yaari, M.E. (1988): A Controversial Proposal Concerning Inequality Measurement, Journal of 
Economic Theory, 44, 381-397. 
